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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal Pigouvian tax for correcting pollution when the government
also uses distortionary taxes to raise revenues. When preferences are quasilinear in leisure
and additive, the Pigovian tax can be separated from the Ramsey revenue-raising tax.
We characterize the relationship between the Pigouvian tax and marginal social damages
in a variety of circumstances. In a setting with homogeneous households, the Pigouvian
tax exceeds marginal damages if goods have inelastic demands, and vice versa. When
households are heterogeneous so taxes can be redistributive, the Pigouvian tax gives more
weight to damages suﬀered by low-income persons. The analysis is extended to allow for
costly abatement. In general corrective taxes have to be applied to both emissions and
output of the polluting good.
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This paper explores the issue of the optimal tax for correcting externalities from pollution
when the government is raising revenues using distortionary taxes. In particular, will the
Pigouvian component of the tax on a polluting good equal the marginal damages to house-
holds (as it does in a ﬁrst-best world), and how will the Pigouvian tax change as revenue
requirements rise? The general analysis of optimal taxes in the presence of externalities
has been available in the literature at least since Sandmo’s (1975) seminal paper. Cremer,
et al (1998) and Cremer and Gahvari (2001) have reﬁned the analysis to take account of
nonlinear income taxation and the existence of an abatement technology. However, their
results are somewhat formal and the precise applicability of them to environmental taxa-
tion remains unclear. Partly this is because optimal revenue-raising taxes and Pigouvian
taxes interact in a complicated way in optimal tax characterizations since closed-form so-
lutions are generally not possible: formulas for optimal tax rates are generally only in
implicit terms. This lack of clarity has been stressed in the recent literature on the double
dividend from environmental taxes, which has cast doubt on whether there is, in fact, a full
double dividend: one dividend from correcting externalities, the other from the revenue
raised. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), for example, suggest that environmental taxes
might exacerbate the tax distortions that already exist. This would suggest that the envi-
ronmental (Pigouvian) tax should be less than marginal damages to households. Others,
such as Jaeger (2001), have argued the opposite.
Part of the problem, as noted by Cremer et al (2001), lies with identifying precisely what
is the Pigouvian component of the tax on the polluting good. In an optimal tax world,
the tax on a polluting good will comprise both a Ramsey (revenue-raising) eﬀect and a
Pigouvian (corrective) eﬀect, and disentangling them will generally not be possible (since
the imposition of a corrective tax will aﬀect optimal revenue-raising taxes, and vice versa).
Moreover, as Auerbach and Hines (2002) have stressed in their recent survey of optimal
taxation, the interpretation of Pigouvian commodity taxes becomes confounded depending
on whether commodity taxes or income taxes are used for revenue raising. In particular,
this aﬀects the marginal utility of income for the consumer, and therefore the value of the
1numeraire for measuring marginal damages.
To address these issues, we adopt a simple formulation for the household utility function
that allows for a natural separation between Ramsey and Pigouvian taxes and for explicit
solutions to optimal tax rates, similar in spirit to that used by Cremer et al (2001). The
utility function is assumed to be quasilinear in leisure, so that the demand for goods
depends only on own prices relative to the wage rate, and not on either income or other
goods’ prices. We explore the size of the Pigouvian tax relative to the size of marginal
damages to households in a variety of settings. These include the basic case where only
commodity taxes are used, the case where a wage income tax is used, the case where there
is an abatement technology, and the case where households have diﬀerent wage rates and
a optimal income tax, either linear or nonlinear is used.
2 The Basic Ramsey Optimal Commodity Tax Model
The model we use for our benchmark analysis is the simplest and most transparent one
for our purposes. It consists of a population of identical households with quasilinear pref-
erences in labor/leisure from whom the government must extract a given amount of tax
revenues at the least cost using distorting commodity taxes. It diﬀers from the standard
optimal commodity tax model in that the consumption of one good emits some harm-
ful environmental externality. The choice of quasilinear preferences implies that goods’
demands depend only on own prices and not on the prices of other goods or income, ef-
fectively leading to a quasi-partial equilibrium setting. This formulation is chosen partly
because the disaggregation of taxes into Ramsey (revenue-raising) and Pigouvian (correc-
tive) components can be made as clearly as possible, and also because closed-form solutions
for optimal taxes can be derived.
More formally, the economy consists of N households, each of whose utility function takes
the quasilinear form UC(C)+UD(D)+E −L where UC(C) and UD(D) are increasing and
strictly concave functions. Using mnemonic notation, good C is a clean good, good D is a
2dirty good, E is the quality of the environment and L is labor supplied.1 One can think of
labor supply as being L = T − H, where T is time available and H is leisure. The quality
of the environment is given by E = E − δND, where E is its quality in the absence of
pollution and δ is the marginal damage to the environment per unit of consumption of the
dirty good, with δ assumed for simplicity to be constant. Thus, each person’s consumption
of D aﬀects the quality of the environment enjoyed by all N households. We suppose that
N is large enough that each person treats the quality of the environment E as given, and
thus independent of their own consumption of D.
Production is linear in this economy and we normalize the producer prices of the two goods
to unity. The wage rate is taken to be w, although it too could be normalized as desired.
It is useful for expositional purposes not to set it to unity. The government requires an
amount of resources valued at R, so the economy’s aggregate production constraint is:
NC + ND + R = NwL (1)
Following the Ramsey optimal tax approach (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980), the gov-
ernment cannot levy lump-sum taxes on consumers so must impose taxes on transactions.
In this economy with three goods, C,D and leisure or labor, the government could use
three taxes. However, it is well-known that one tax rate is always redundant (e.g., a tax
on labor is equivalent to proportional taxes on goods). In our basic model, we assume
that the government dispenses with taxes on labor and uses only taxes on the two goods,
denoted tC and tD. Consumer prices are then given by 1 + tC and 1 + tD. The tax on D
takes account of the externality associated with its consumption.
Given that households have no initial endowments, their individual budget constraint can
be written:
(1 + tC)C + (1 + tD)D = wL (2)
Combining the aggregate of (2) for all N households with (1), we immediately obtain the
1 More generally, our analysis applies when there are many clean goods, as in Cremer et al (2001).
Since little insight is gained by having more than one clean good, we aggregate them all into
once composite good C.
3government revenue constraint:
NtCC + NtDD = R (3)
Thus, only two of the economy’s three constraints, (1), (2) and (3), need to be taken
account of explicitly, and the other is implied.
To solve the government’s optimal tax problem, consider ﬁrst household behavior. House-
holds maximize utility, taking E as given, subject to their budget constraint (2). The
Lagrangian is:
Υ(C,D,L,α) = UC(C) + UD(D) + E − L − α

(1 + tC)C + (1 + tD)D − wL

The ﬁrst-order conditions on C, D and L are:
U0
C(C) − α(1 + tC) = 0, U0
D(D) − α(1 + tD) = 0, −1 + αw = 0












where C0(·) < 0 and D0(·) < 0. The fact that α is constant is a consequence of the
quasilinear utility function, and is useful for purposes of interpretation. Notice that because
of the additive utility function, not only do cross-price and income eﬀects disappear, but
also goods demands are independent of environmental quality, E.









where, by the envelope theorem, we have:
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Given the behavior of the households, the government’s problem is to choose tax rates to
maximize the sum of indirect utilities subject to its revenue constraint (3) and treating
the quality of the environment E as endogenous. The government’s Lagrangian is:
L(tC,tD,λ) = N





NtCC(·) + NtDD(·) − R

























Given that demands for C and D depend only on own relative prices, which depend on
own tax rates, (5) and (6) implicitly determine tax rates as a function of the shadow price
of government revenue, tC(λ) and tD(λ). We shall exploit these relationships below.







































In the absence of environmental externalities, δ = 0, (7) and (8) are the familiar inverse
















where the tax rates are expressed as ad valorem taxes based on consumer prices.
Note that λ > α when the government is using distortionary taxes. If the government had
access to non-distortionary taxes so λ = α = 1/w, the tax on good D by (8) would be the
ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax, tD = Nδ/α. That is, tD would be set equal to marginal damages
measured in terms of household income.
When taxes are distortionary, so λ > α, (8) corresponds to the optimal tax expression
obtained by Cremer et al (1998), albeit here in a much simpler context with homoge-
neous households. (Their analysis involves heterogeneous households and nonlinear income
taxation as well as commodity taxes.) The optimal tax on D consists of two separate
5components, one seeming to involve a ‘Ramsey’ component and the other a ‘Pigouvian’
component. However, the decomposition is incomplete and ambiguous for a couple of rea-
sons. For one, the total tax rate tD, which includes both the Ramsey and the Pigouvian
component, also appears on the right-hand side of (8), including as an argument of ηD.
As well, the second term involving the pollution externality is not exactly the marginal
damages suﬀered by consumers since it is discounted by the shadow price of funds to the
government, λ. In order to explore this more carefully, we put slightly more structure on
the problem in the following section by assuming elasticities of demand are constant.
3 Pigouvian Taxes in the Basic Model: A Special Case
To facilitate the interpretation of Pigouvian taxes in the above Ramsey optimal commodity
tax model, let us make the following two special assumptions. Assume that the elasticities
of demand for the two goods are constant, and assume that they are equal to one another.
Thus, η = ηC = ηD, where η is a constant. These assumptions are pedagogically useful
since they allow us to solve for the properties of corrective taxes explicitly. Moreover, in
this context, the meaning of the Ramsey component of the tax structure is apparent.2 If the
elasticities of demand are equal, the Ramsey component of the commodity tax structure
would be uniform. We can therefore interpret the diﬀerence in commodity tax rates as the
Pigouvian component of the tax on the dirty good, denoted tP = tD − tC.
Given these assumptions, (8) becomes
tC + tP =
α − λ
λ





Using (7) with ηC = η, this can be solved for tP:
tP =
ηNδ
(η + 1)λ − α
(10)
Thus, our assumptions have allowed us to obtain an explicit solution for tP which we can
use to obtain two relevant properties of the Pigouvian tax.
2 Our analysis also applies in the case where ηC and ηD are constant but diﬀerent in size, but
the analysis is simpler when they are equal. With diﬀerent elasticities the Ramsey taxes would
be proportional to the ratio of elasticities rather than being identical to one another.
6First, note that if η = −1, (10) reduces to tP = Nδ/α. That is, the Pigouvian tax is
equal to marginal social damages measured in terms of household utility. Furthermore,





((η + 1)λ − α)2 > 0 (11)
This implies that tP increases as |η| decreases, implying that tP > Nδ/α for −η < 1 and
vice versa. We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In the basic model with elasticities of demand constant for both goods,
the Pigouvian component of the tax on good D will be greater (less) than marginal social
damages to the households if goods are inelastic (elastic) in demand.
The intuition for this seems to be as follows. Imposing a Pigouvian tax on good D requires
deviating from equal taxes on both goods, which involves an eﬃciency cost. The optimal
tax must trade oﬀ this eﬃciency cost against the beneﬁts of decreasing environmental
damages. Since deviating from equal taxes on both goods involves a greater eﬃciency cost
when demands are more elastic, the Pigouvian tax will be smaller in this case.
Next, recall that in this case with quasilinear preferences, the ﬁrst order conditions (5) and
(6), or equivalently (7) and (8) implicitly determine the tax rates tC and tD as a function
of λ respectively, that is, the size of revenue requirements. In the special case where
the elasticities of demand are constant and equal, we can investigate how the Pigouvian
component of the tax on D, tP, varies with revenue requirements. To do so, diﬀerentiate





((η + 1)λ − α)
2 R 0 as 1 R −η (12)
Thus, tP will increase with revenue requirements if the demand for goods is inelastic, and
decrease if demand is elastic. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2: In the basic model with elasticities of demand constant for both goods, the
Pigouvian component of the tax on good D will diverge more from marginal social damages
(positively in the case of inelastic demands, negatively in the case of elastic demands) as
revenue requirements increase.
7The results of this section apply when the government uses only commodity taxes. In the
special case studied here where demand elasticities for both goods are constant and equal,
the government could apply a proportional tax on the consumer purchases of both goods,
such as a uniform VAT, and accompany it with a Pigouvian tax on the consumption of
good D. The Pigouvian tax would then be greater or less than marginal damages to the
consumer according to whether the demands are inelastic or elastic. Next, we investigate
the case where the uniform tax is applied to income (wages) rather than consumption.
4 Pigouvian Taxes Combined with a Wage Tax
We continue to assume that preferences are quasilinear and that demand elasticities are
equal and constant. However, instead of imposing taxes on the two goods, we use a tax
on labor income along with a tax on good D. Let tw be the tax rate on wage income and
tP be the tax on the dirty good, which in this case we can think of as the Pigouvian tax.
Then, the household budget constraint is C+(1+tP)D = (1−tw)wL, and the Lagrangian
function for the household problem becomes:
Υ(C,D,L,α) = UC(C) + UD(D) + E − L − α

C + (1 + tP)D − (1 − tw)wL

The ﬁrst-order conditions on C, D and L are now:
U0
C(C) − α = 0, U0
D(D) − α(1 + tP) = 0, −1 + α(1 − tw)w = 0
which yield the demands for C and D (and implicitly the supply of labor) and the marginal





















and the envelope theorem gives:
VtP(·) = −αD(·) = −
D(·)
(1 − tw)w
and Vtw(·) = −αwL(·) = −
L(·)
(1 − tw)
8Turning to the government’s problem, we ﬁrst obtain an expression for the government’s
budget constraint. To do so, we can use the resource constraint for the economy, which as
above is NC + ND + R = NwL. Combining this with the aggregate budget constraint of
the consumers, we obtain NtPD + NwtwL = R. From the household budget constraint,















D(·) = R (13)
Given the government’s budget constraint (13), the Lagrangian function for the govern-
ment’s optimal tax problem can be written:
L(tP,tw,λ) = N
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Using the second equation to eliminate terms from the ﬁrst equation, the value of L from



























Analogously to the basic model, we can use (14) to get an expressions for the Pigouvian
tax tP. First note that, using the relative prices in this case, the common elasticity of











9Using these expressions and the fact that 1/w = (1 − tw)α, the equations in (14) can be
rewritten:











Combining these two expressions and solving for tP, we obtain:
tP =
ηNδ(1 − tw)
(η + 1)λ − (1 − tw)α
(16)
which is the analog of (10) in this case.
Proceeding as before, we see that when η = −1, tP = Nδ/α so the Pigouvian tax equals





(λ − (1 − tw)α)Nδ(1 − tw)
((η + 1)λ − (1 − tw)α)2 > 0
This the analog of (11), so Proposition 1 applies. Similarly, diﬀerentiating (16) with respect




Nδη(1 − tw)(η + 1)
((η + 1)λ − (1 − tw)α)
2 R 0 as 1 R −η
This is equivalent to (12) implying that Proposition 2 also applies. Not surprisingly, our
results are independent of whether the government uses a set of diﬀerential commodity
taxes or a wage tax combined with a tax on good D.3
5 Pigouvian Taxes with Pollution Abatement
So far we have assumed that the externality is proportional to the output of the dirty good.
Let us now suppose that pollution emissions arising from the use of good D can be reduced
by an abatement technology, as in Cremer and Gahvari (2001). Pollution abatement is
modeled is the simplest way consistent with making the point. Let A be total abatement
such that ND−A are total emissions of pollution by the dirty good industry. The quality
3 The analysis would be slightly more complicated if the elasticities of demand were diﬀerent for
the two goods since then the Ramsey taxes would not be equal to one another.
10of the environment then becomes E = E −δ(ND −A), following the above notation. The
total cost of abatement borne by producers is given by Z(A), where Z0(A),Z00(A) > 0.
We revert to the commodity tax model of Section 3, but in addition to commodity taxes
tC and tD imposed on the sales of goods C and D, there is also a per unit tax tE imposed
on emissions by producers.
Given the level of abatement A, the tax tE applies on incremental production of output
D. Assuming A < ND, the producer price of D is therefore 1+tE. Producer costs include
inputs into the production of D, which given unit costs are simply ND, as well as taxes
on emissions and the cost of abatement. Given the producer price, 1 + tE, proﬁts of the
producers in industry D are therefore:
Π ≡ (1 + tE)ND − ND − tE(ND − A) − Z(A) = tEA − Z(A) (17)
Producers will choose A to maximize their proﬁts, which leads to the ﬁrst-order condition
tE = Z0(A), whose solution is A(tE) with A0(tE) > 0. We assume for simplicity that the
government taxes these proﬁts fully.
Consumer prices for C and D are 1+tC and 1+tD+tE, and as before the wage rate is ﬁxed
at w. The consumer budget constraint is (1 + tC)C + (1 + tD + tE)D = wL. Consumers
maximize utility, given E, subject to their budget constraint. The Lagrangian is:
Υ(C,D,L,α) = UC(C) + UD(D) + E − L − α

(1 + tC)C + (1 + tD + tE)D − wL





















with α = 1/w. Applying the envelope theorem yields:
VtC = −αC = −
C
w




The resource constraint for the economy is NC +ND +Z(A)+R = NwL+Π, where Π
satisﬁes (17). Together with the aggregate household budget constraint, this leads to the
11government revenue constraint NtCC + NtDD + tE(ND − A) + Π = R. Given this, the
Lagrangian expression for the problem of the government, using (17), is:
























































1 + tD + tE
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tD + tE =
α − λ
λ






which are analogous to (7) and (8) in our base case. In this case, the total tax on good D is
tD+tE, and following the earlier logic, the Pigouvian tax can be deﬁned as tP ≡ tD+tE−tC.
By (23), we have
tC + tP =
α − λ
λ





which reduces using (22) to:
tP =
ηNδ
(η + 1)λ − α
(24)
This Pigouvian component of the total tax on good D is the same as in the basic case
without abatement, given by (10). The same analysis as before leads to the analogs of
Propositions 1 and 2 in this case, given the deﬁnition of the Pigouvian tax used here.
12In this case, the Pigouvian component is more complicated than earlier since now it includes
the tax on emissions tE as well as the diﬀerence in commodity taxes tD − tC. We can use






This component of the Pigouvian tax is lower than marginal damages Nδ/α, since λ > α.
The other component tD − tC is given by combining (24) and (25) to yield:





λη − (α − λ)

Thus, tD > tC if λη−(α−λ) < 0 (since the numerator is negative). In fact, this condition






Therefore, assuming tC > 0, this implies that λ − α < −λη, which in turn implies that
tD > tC. This means that the Pigouvian tax incorporates not just a tax on emissions, but
also a diﬀerential tax on tD.
Note further that if the government could levy a non-distorting lump-sum tax, then α = λ,
so there would be no diﬀerential tax on D (tC = tD), and the tax on emissions would equal
marginal damages to the consumers tE = Nδ/α = Nδ/λ. We can summarize these results
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: When producers can reduce emissions of pollution by costly abatement,
1. the Pigouvian component of the second-best commodity tax system includes both a tax
on emissions and a diﬀerential tax on sales of the dirty good,
2. the second-best tax on emissions is less that its ﬁrst-best level, while the diﬀerential
tax on D exceeds its ﬁrst-best level, which is zero, and
3. the composite Pigouvian tax satisﬁes Propositions 1 and 2.
A ﬁnal apparent implication of this analysis is that if the government uses a wage tax
rather than commodity taxes on tD and tC, it can only achieve the second-best optimum
13by imposing a two-component Pigouvian corrective tax. One component is the tax on
emissions, while the other is a tax on sales of good D.
6 Pigouvian Taxes and Linear Progressive Taxation
Suppose now that households are heterogeneous. Following the optimal income tax liter-
ature, we assume that they diﬀer only in their wage rates, but otherwise the model used
above applies. It suﬃces to restrict our attention to two wage-types, w1 and w2 with
w2 > w1, where N1 and N2 are the numbers of the two types. The government is assumed
to be able to observe income wiLi, i = 1,2, but neither the wage rate wi nor labor supply
L. We begin with the case where the government uses a linear progressive income tax
as well as a Pigouvian tax tP on the polluting good D. The income tax consists of a
constant marginal tax rate tw combined with an equal per capita subsidy s. The budget
constraint for a household with wage rate wi becomes Ci +(1+tP)Di = (1−tw)wiLi +s.
The household maximizes utility subject to this budget constraint, and the solution gives






















where E is now E − δ(N1D1 + N2D2). The envelope theorem gives:
V i









Using the aggregate household budget constraint and the economy’s resource constraint
as before, the government revenue constraint can be written
tw
1 − tw
(N1C1 + N2C2) +
tw + tP
1 − tw




The government problem is treated as a Pareto maximizing one, and we can take the
objective function to be ρ1N1(V 1(·)+E)+ρ2N2(V 2(·)+E). The social weights ρ1,ρ2 are
14arbitrary, although it is useful to suppose that they are chosen such that the government
wants to redistribute from the high-wage to the low-wage types. That implies that the
marginal social utility of income of the latter exceeds the marginal social utility of income
of the former, or ρ1α1 > ρ2α2 in the optimum. If the government could use lump-sum
taxation, it would equate these marginal social utilities in a ﬁrst-best optimum. The latter
serves as a useful benchmark below.
The government maximizes its objective function subject to its revenue constraint. Using
the ﬁrst-order condition on s, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to tw and tP reduce


















































where N ≡ ρ1N1 + ρ2N2. These are the analogs of (14) above in the wage tax case. Let

























Using these deﬁnitions, (26) and (27) can be written:



















These are weighted averages of the marginal social utilities of income of the two wage
types, weighted by their shares of consumption of the two goods.4
4 The expressions αC and αD are analogous to the distributive weights for optimal commodity
taxes (or public sector prices) deﬁned by Feldstein (1972).
15Given our assumption about utility functions, preferences are homothetic in C and D and
separable from leisure, which implies that C1/D1 = C2/D2, so that αC = αD ≡ α. Then,
the equations in (28) are the same as those in (15) in the homogeneous-consumer case
when α replaces α and N replaces N, so the same derivation yields the analog of (16):
tP =
ηNδ(1 − tw)
(η + 1)λ − (1 − tw)α
(30)
The analogs of Propositions 1 and 2 then apply. In particular, when η = −1, tP = Nδ/α,
while tP is increasing in η. As well, ∂tP/∂λ R 0 as 1 R −η.
To interpret this, consider the ﬁrst-best outcome with lump-sum redistributive taxes and a
Pigouvian tax. The lump-sum taxes are used to equate marginal social utilities of income
to the shadow price of government revenue, while the Pigouvian tax is set equal to the
sum of marginal damages to the households:







With linear progressive taxes, marginal social utilities of income cannot be equated. In
these circumstances, we can use tP = Nδ/α obtained when η = −1 as a benchmark and























The implication is that, compared with the ﬁrst best, the Pigouvian tax puts more weight
on marginal damages to the low-wage persons than to the high-wage persons, thus taking on
some redistibutive role to complement the linear income tax system. This is reminiscent of
the result of Sandmo (2006) that in the absence of full international redistributive transfers,
low-income countries should have lower pollution taxes than high-income countries. We
can summarize these results in the following proposition, which is related to Propositions
1 and 2.
16Proposition 4: Suppose households diﬀer in wage rates but have the same quasilinear-
in-leisure preferences, and the government uses a linear progressive income tax.
1. When the elasticity of demand for goods is unity, tP = ρ1N1δ/α + ρ2N2δ/α, which
diﬀers from social marginal damages by putting relatively more weight on damages to
low-wage persons and less weight on damages to high-wage persons.
2. The Pigouvian tax tP falls with the absolute value of the elasticity of demand.
3. The Pigouvian tax increases with revenue requirements if η < −1, and vice versa.
7 Pigouvian Taxes and a Nonlinear Income Tax
Suppose now that the government levies a nonlinear tax on income. Let the before-tax
income of a household with wage rate wi be Yi = wiLi. Given that the government can
observe Yi, it is useful to transform the utility function into one involving income rather
than labor supply as follows:
Ωi(C,D,Y ) + E ≡ UC(C) + UD(D) − Y/wi + E (32)
where Ωi is type-speciﬁc.
While the government can observe income, it cannot observe individual purchases of C and
D. It can therefore levy a non-linear income tax on Y , but only impersonal indirect taxes
on commodity purchases. From an analytical perspective, it suﬃces to consider only a tax
on D: proportionate taxes on C and D can be subsumed into the income tax function so
we can normalize one commodity tax rate to be zero. Let tD be the per unit tax rate on
commodity D, so the consumer price is qD = 1 + tD. Suppose that T(Y ) is a nonlinear
tax function applied to pre-tax income. We can then deﬁne I as disposable income (total
consumption expenditures), where I = Y −T(Y ). Although the government cannot observe
how I is divided between C and D, it does know the consumer utility function. If it knew
a person’s type, it could infer a household’s labor supply from its income and would
therefore know how each household spends its income. However, households of one type
can mimic one another’s (I,Y ) bundle, which precludes the government from inferring L
17and constrains government policy. All this is well known from optimal income tax theory
(e.g., Stiglitz, 1987).
As above, we ﬁrst characterize household behavior and then turn to the government. A
household of type i maximizes Ωi(C,D,Y )+E subject to a budget constraint C +qDD =
I = Y − T(Y ). It turns out to be useful for the purposes of analysis to disaggregate
household behavior into two successive stages. In the ﬁrst stage, they choose their labor
supply, and therefore the combination of Y and I. In the second stage, they allocate I
between C and D. The analysis of household behavior is considered in reverse order.
In stage 2, I and Y have been determined and are taken as given. From the household’s
budget constraint, C = I − qDD. Therefore, the problem of a representative household of
a given type can be written (with superscripts suppressed): max{D} Ω(I−qDD,D,Y )+E.
The ﬁrst-order condition is −qDΩC + ΩD = 0, which yields the demand for D with the











The sign of ∂D/∂Y depends on the substitute/complement relations between D and L.
Since preferences are separable, labor supply and thus income do not aﬀect preferences for
C and D. So, given I, a change in Y will not aﬀect the demand for D. Therefore, we can
write the demand for D as simply D(qD,I).
The maximum value function for the consumer—the indirect utility function—is denoted
W(qD,I,Y ) + E. Applying the envelope theorem to this problem, we obtain:
WqD = −DΩC = −DU0
C(C), WI = ΩC = U0




For a given value of qD, consumer indiﬀerence curves in Y and I can be drawn. They have
a slope of −WY /WI = 1/(wU0






As mentioned, households of a given type may mimic the consumption-income (I,Y ) bun-
dles of the other type. If we assume that the government will redistribute from the high-
to the low-wage types starting in the laissez faire, the case of interest for us is where the
18high-wage types are tempted to mimic the low-wage types. Let b Ω2(I1 − qDD,D,Y1) + E
denote the utility of the type 2’s when they are mimicking the consumption-income
bundle of the type 1’s. The problem for the high-wage mimickers in stage 2 is then:
max{D} b Ω2(I1 − qDD,D,Y1) + E. This yields the demand function b D2(qD,I,Y ) which
has the same properties as for the non-mimickers. The indirect utility function for the
mimickers is denoted c W2(qD,I1,Y1) + E.
The relationship between D1 and b D2 is important in what follows. Both type 1’s and
mimicking type 2’s will have the same consumption expenditures and incomes, while labor
supply is lower for the mimicker (since the same income can be earned with lower L).
Therefore, since consumption goods are separable from leisure in the utility function,
D1 = b D2 in our case. If D had been more complementary than C with leisure, D1 < b D2,
and vice versa.
Turn now to stage 1. In this stage, households choose their labor supply, or equivalently,
their income. If eﬀect, they choose the most preferred bundle (I,Y ) from the budget
constraint I = Y − T(Y ). Given this behavior, the government chooses its tax policies,
both T(Y ) and tD. Following the optimal income tax approach, instead of analyzing the
government choice of T(Y ), we use the direct approach and let the government oﬀer the
bundles (I1,Y1), (I2,Y2) for the two household types. Then households faced with the
bundles oﬀered choose their most preferred.
As before, we characterize a Pareto optimal tax policy, focusing on those Pareto optimal
outcomes for which the incentive constraint on the type 2’s is binding. (This will be
consistent with a social welfare function that exhibits aversion to inequality.) The optimal
policy problem for the case where the incentive constraint applies only to the high-ability












W2(qD,I2,Y2) + E ≥ c W2(qD,I1,Y1) + E (γ)
N1





Y2 − I2 + tDD2(qD,I2)

= R (λ)




, while γ and λ
refer to the Lagrange multipliers in the respective constraints.
The ﬁrst-order conditions on I1, Y1, I2, Y2 and tD are:
ρ1N1W1












Y − γc W2













Y + λN2 = 0 (37)
ρ1N1W1
qD + (ρ2N2 + γ)W2




















where, as before, N = ρ1N1 + ρ2N2. These conditions give the structure of the nonlinear
income tax system as well as the optimal tax on D, tD. Given the assumptions about the
form of the utility function, the so-called Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) Theorem applies.
That is, in the absence of environmental externalities, there would be no diﬀerential tax
on goods. That implies that we can interpret tD as the Pigouvian tax.
To determine the value of tD, combine (34), (36) and (38), using Wi
qD = −DiWi
I from (33)



























In words, the Pigouvian tax is the marginal damages (ρ1N1 + ρ2N2)δ in terms of the
marginal value of government revenue λ. We return to the interpretation of this below.
First, consider the marginal tax rate on the high-wage households. Condition (36) can be
written:
(ρ2N2 + γ)W2




20Using (39), this becomes (ρ2N2 + γ)W2
I − λN2 = 0. Combining this with (37), we obtain
−W2
Y /W2
I = 1, implying that the marginal tax rate at the top is zero. This familiar
condition thus continues to apply when pollution taxes are set optimally. Similar reasoning
shows that the marginal tax rate on the low-wage types has the standard form: it is positive
but less than 100 percent.
Consider now the interpretation of the Pigouvian tax tD given by (39). As a benchmark,
it is useful to recall the ﬁrst-best case where taxes are non-distortionary. In this context,
the incentive constraint is not binding, so γ = 0. Then, from the ﬁrst-order conditions









= ρ1α1 = ρ2α2









The optimal Pigouvian tax equals the sum of marginal damages measured in terms of the
income of each consumer.
When the income tax is distorting so the incentive constraint binds, the government can





Y − c W2
Y ) = −λ(N1 + N2)
By (33), W2
Y = c W2
Y = −1/w2 and W1












Thus, the shadow value of public funds, λ, is a weighted average of marginal social utilities








21Using the above expression for λ and noting that in the second best, marginal social utility
















The implication is that, compared with the ﬁrst best, the Pigouvian tax puts more weight
on marginal damages to the low-wage persons than to the high-wage persons, thus taking
on some redistibutive role to complement the nonlinear income tax system. This might
be contrasted with the results of the basic model whereby the Pigouvian tax deviates
systematically from marginal damages depending on the elasticity of demand.
With more general preferences, the tax on good D would deviate from zero according to
the substitute-complement relationship between the demand for D and leisure, as analyzed
by Edwards et al (1994) and Nava et al (1996). In this case, the formula for tD would
include not just a Pigouvian component but also a component reﬂecting the role of the
indirect tax system as a part of the government’s redistribution policy, as in Cremer et al
(1998). The issue of disaggregating the Pigouvian tax component and the redistributive
component would raise issues similar to those in earlier sections.
Finally, suppose we introduce the possibility of costly abatement into the nonlinear tax
model using the same abatement technology as in Section 5. As before, the producer price
in industry D is 1+tE, and aggregate proﬁts are Π = tEA−Z(A), which are taxed away
by the government. The consumer price for D is qD = 1 + tD + tE. The outcome of stage
2 of the consumers’ utility maximization is exactly as before, yielding consumer demands
Di(qD,Ii) for i = 1,2, demand b D2(qD,I1) for the mimicker, indirect utilities Wi(qD,Ii,Yi)
and c W2(qD,I1,Y1), and the envelope results (33).
The government policy problem is the same as before with tD+tE replacing tD and proﬁts













22The ﬁrst-order conditions on I1,Y1, I2, Y2 and tD are the same as (34)–(38) with tD + tE
replacing tD, where qD = 1 + tD + tE. The ﬁrst-order condition on tE is:
ρ1N1W1
qD + (ρ2N2 + γ)W2













N1D1 + N1(tD + tE)
∂D1
∂qD












Next, proceed exactly as in the previous section by combining the ﬁrst-order conditions
on I1, I2 and tD to obtain the analog of (39):







Then, since tE = Nδ/λ by (42), we obtain tD = 0. Thus, unlike in the linear tax case, the
Pigouvian tax consists only of a tax on emissions: no tax on D is required. Moreover, the
interpretation of the Pigouvian tax is the same as above. More weight is put on marginal
damages to the low-wage than the high-wage persons.
We can summarize these results of Pigouvian taxation in the presence of nonlinear income
taxation as follows.
Proposition 5: When households diﬀer in wage rates but have the same quasilinear-in-
leisure preferences, and the government can use a nonlinear income tax
1. the Pigouvian component of the second-best commodity tax system is a tax on good
D which diﬀers from social marginal damages by putting relatively more weight on
damages to low-wage persons and less weight on damages to high-wage persons,
2. the structure of the optimal nonlinear income tax is the same as in the absence of
pollution, and
3. when a costly abatement technology is available, the Pigouvian tax applies only to
emissions and not to the output of the dirty good, and diﬀers from social marginal
damages in the same way as 1. above.
238 Concluding Remarks
Our purpose in this paper has been to study how Pigouvian taxes diﬀer from marginal
damages to households when the taxes are levied alongside distortionary taxes. Because
taxes used for corrective purposes and taxes used for revenue-raising, which we refer to as
Ramsey taxes, are interdependent, it is generally not possible to disentangle one from the
other. We have speciﬁed a model in which Pigouvian taxes can readily be disaggregated
from Ramsey taxes and used that to determine how the former deviates from marginal
social damages, and how that deviation varies with the amount of revenue that must
be raised. The formulation we use involves household preferences that are quasilinear in
leisure so that demands for goods depend only on own prices. In this setting, qualitatively
clear results emerge.
When the government relies only on commodity taxes, the Pigouvian component of the
tax is the deviation from uniformity of commodity taxes on the clean and dirty goods. The
Pigouvian component will exceed marginal damages when goods’ demands are inelastic,
and vice versa. Not surprisingly, the same result applies when, instead of commodity
taxes, a labor income tax is used along with a tax on the dirty good. When an abatement
technology is introduced into the basic setting, the Pigouvian component of taxation follows
the same pattern as in the basic model. However, while damage is now a result of emissions,
the Pigouvian component includes both a tax on emissions and a tax on the sales of the
dirty good, even though in a ﬁrst-best world, only the former would be used. Finally,
when households are heterogeneous and the tax system is used not just for revenue-raising
but also for redistribution, matters change. In the case where the government uses all
the instruments at its disposal and levies a nonlinear income tax, there is no longer a
presumption that the Pigouvian tax will be either higher or lower than marginal social
damages. Instead, the tax is set equal to a sum of damages to the low- and high-wage
persons in the economy but with relatively more weight put on marginal damages to the
former and less to the latter compared with social damages. The addition of abatement
possibilities changes little in this case. Unlike with linear taxation, only a tax on emissions
should be used and not a tax on total use of the dirty good.
24Our analysis relies on some important simplifying assumptions, particularly the quasilin-
earity of preferences. As mentioned, these preferences were used to facilitate the clean
separation of corrective from revenue-raising components of taxation. In a more compli-
cated setting, analytical solutions would generally be hard to come by, so one may have to
resort to computational methods.
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